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ABSTRACT
The SEC reviews firm filings and issues comment letters on those filings. These comment letters play
an important role in the assessment of firm value. These activities are seasonally compressed because
over 70 percent of registrants have a December fiscal year-end. Research in other settings finds that
busyness leads to negative outcomes. We examine how busyness impacts the frequency, scope, and
timeliness of comment letters. We find that the SEC issues fewer comment letters when busy, focuses
its limited resources on the most severe cases of disclosure noncompliance, and extends the amount of
time between receiving a firm’s filing and issuing a comment letter. Despite this, we find no evidence
that the SEC misses more serious compliance issues when busy. Our results have implications for
policymakers responsible for allocating resources to the SEC.
En quoi l’affairement influe sur les activités de la SEC
visant le respect des obligations en matière de conformité :
données tirées du processus d’examen des déclarations et des
lettres de commentaires
RÉSUMÉ
La SEC procède à l’examen des déclarations des sociétés et publie des lettres de commentaires sur
ces déclarations. Ces lettres de commentaires jouent un rôle important dans l’estimation de la val-
eur d’une entreprise. L’intensité de ces activités de la SEC varie selon la saison, compte tenu du
fait que l’exercice de plus de 70 pour cent des sociétés inscrites se termine en décembre. Des
recherches menées dans d’autres contextes indiquent que l’affairement conduit à des résultats
négatifs. Les auteures se demandent en quoi l’affairement influe sur la fréquence, la portée et la
rapidité de publication des lettres de commentaires. Elles constatent que la SEC, lorsqu’elle se
trouve en période d’effervescence, publie moins de lettres de commentaires, concentre les res-
sources limitées dont elle dispose sur les cas les plus graves de non-conformité des déclarations
et allonge le délai qui s’écoule entre la réception de la déclaration d’une société et la publication
de la lettre de commentaires. En dépit de ces observations, les auteures ne relèvent aucune donnée
qui démontrerait que la SEC omet des problèmes de conformité plus sérieux lorsqu’elle est
affairée. Ces résultats intéresseront les responsables de l’élaboration des politiques chargés de
l’affectation des ressources à la SEC.
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1. Introduction
To facilitate compliance with disclosure regulations, Assistant Director Offices (ADOs) of the
Division of Corporation Finance (“Corp Fin”) at the SEC review filings of public registrants and
issue comment letters for noncompliance with GAAP or deficiencies in disclosure.1 The workload
for these reviews is seasonally compressed because a majority of registrants have a December fis-
cal year-end. We attempt to understand how the SEC directs its limited resources when busy.
Specifically, we examine how busyness impacts the frequency, scope, and timeliness of comment
letters.
Several studies suggest that workload compression (“busyness”) negatively impacts the out-
comes of various financial professionals. For example, Lopez and Peters (2012) find that audit
quality is lower when auditors are busy. Tanyi and Smith (2015) find similar results for busy
financial experts on the audit committee; their results imply that financial reporting quality
declines when expert directors are busy. Finally, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report that having
busy directors is associated with weaker corporate governance. Previous studies also find that
comment letters influence a firm’s information environment and have capital market conse-
quences. For example, Johnston and Petacchi (2017) report that comment letters improve firms’
information environment, and Dechow et al. (2016) find a negative market reaction and increased
insider sales around the announcement of 10-K comment letters related to revenue recognition.
Given the potential for workload compression to adversely affect SEC compliance activities and
the critical role the comment letter process plays in the assessment of firm value, it is important
to understand how the SEC responds to seasonal busyness.
Seasonality in firms’ choice of fiscal year-end leads to predictable clustering of 10-K filing
dates across ADO offices. We use a binary variable to indicate December fiscal year-end as our
busyness proxy because over 70 percent of firm-years in our sample end their fiscal year in
December. To mitigate concerns that our measure captures variation in reporting quality concur-
rent with fiscal year-end choice, we include other firm determinants known to vary predictably
with fiscal year-end choice (including firm size, leverage, beta, and industry membership).
Our first hypothesis examines the association between ADO busyness and 10-K comment let-
ter issuance. The SEC’s decision to issue a comment letter is a joint function of the probability
that a filing is reviewed and the probability that a comment letter is issued, conditional on review.
We employ a bivariate probit model that allows us to explicitly model both of the processes
underlying the observable outcome of comment letter issuance. This methodological innovation
overcomes deficiencies in prior studies, which implicitly assume that only firms that receive com-
ment letters were reviewed and firms that did not receive comment letters were not reviewed. This
assumption leads to biased estimators.2 Conditional on reviewing a filing, we find that the SEC’s
propensity to issue a 10-K comment letter is lower for registrants with a December fiscal year-
end than for registrants with a non-December fiscal year-end.3
Our second set of hypotheses explores how the SEC allocates its limited resources during
periods of workload compression. If the SEC focuses attention on the most significant issues of
noncompliance, we would expect to find a higher likelihood of comment letters raising serious
issues for registrants with a December fiscal year-end than for registrants with a non-December
fiscal year-end. As in prior studies, we classify comment letters as serious if they initiate a finan-
cial statement restatement or identify an issue related to revenue recognition. Our results suggest
that, despite issuing fewer comment letters when busy, the SEC focuses on more serious issues of
noncompliance during busy periods. We find no evidence that the SEC overlooks material
noncompliance during periods of workload compression.
1. We use the terms SEC, ADO, and Corp Fin interchangeably.
2. We discuss the bivariate probit model in greater detail in section 5.
3. Although this relation is statistically significant, it may not be economically significant. The likelihood that the SEC
issues a comment letter is only 1.56 percent lower during busy relative to less busy periods.
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Our third and final hypothesis explores how busyness affects the timeliness of the comment
letter process. Timeliness is an important metric because comment letters contain stock price
moving information. Unlike auditors, ADOs do not face external deadlines with regard to com-
ment letter issuance. Therefore, ADOs may use this flexibility to slow comment letter issuance
during periods of high workload compression. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a positive
association between busyness and comment letter processing time. We also find ADOs prioritize
larger firms when busy.
We are the first to investigate how seasonal busyness affects SEC compliance activities, partic-
ularly filing reviews and the issuance of comment letters. Several related papers examine the associ-
ation between the SEC’s workload and its enforcement activities, which differ in nature and
purpose from compliance. For example, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that firms located closer to
SEC regional offices, where the SEC’s enforcement staff are based, are more likely to restate their
financial statements. DeFond et al. (2018) find that non-Big 4 auditors’ behavior is affected by their
proximity to the SEC’s regional offices and that this proximity affects enforcement. Given the dis-
parate nature of these functions, which are in separate divisions with separate budgets and staffs,
understanding how compliance activities are influenced by resource constraints is important.4
The SEC’s decision to issue a comment letter is a joint function of the probability that a fil-
ing is reviewed and the probability that a comment letter is issued on that filing. The decision to
a review a filing is not observable to researchers; prior literature on compliance implicitly
assumes that the probability of filing review is embedded in the observable outcome of comment
letter issuance (e.g., Johnston and Petacchi 2017). However, Poirier (1980) suggests that doing so
biases estimators. To address this issue, we employ a bivariate probit model that estimates both
the probability that the SEC selects a filing for review and the probability that a comment letter is
issued (conditional on a filing review having been conducted). To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to incorporate this tool into studies of the comment letter process, and this methodol-
ogy should interest scholars working on similar studies.
Our findings should be of interest to regulators and complement research examining com-
ment letter quality of transactional filings (e.g., IPOs and acquisitions).5 In addition, our results
have implications for policymakers responsible for allocating resources to the SEC. Were ADOs
better resourced, our findings suggest that they would broaden the scope of 10-K comment letters
beyond identifying issues about GAAP compliance and revenue recognition and reduce comment
letter processing time. Policymakers should weigh the benefits of comment letters that are broader
in scope and timelier, net of the cost of devoting additional resources to the compliance process.
2. The SEC filing review process
The SEC is organized into five divisions: Corporation Finance (Corp Fin), Enforcement, Invest-
ment Management, Economic and Risk Analysis, and Trading and Markets. Each division plays
an important role in the SEC’s financial reporting oversight. According to the SEC Agency
Financial Report (SEC 2017, 10) the goals of Corp Fin are to help “investors gain access to mate-
rially complete and accurate information about companies and the securities they offer and sell to
facilitate capital formation.” To execute its compliance function, Corp Fin reviews registrants’ fil-
ings, such as 10-Ks and 10-Qs, and issues comment letters to address deficiencies in the disclo-
sures of these filings.
4. For example, the SEC Congressional Budget Justification Report (SEC 2014, 13–14) reports that the Division of
Corporation Finance comprises 10.12 percent of the annual SEC budget and 11.99 percent of total employees at the
SEC. The Division of Enforcement comprises 32.74 percent of the annual SEC budget and 33 percent of total
employees at the SEC.
5. Ege et al. (2018) examine the influence of resource constraints on comment letters related to transactional filings
(e.g., IPOs, acquisitions). Transactional filings require immediate review by the SEC. While our study presents the
effects of comment letter effectiveness when busyness can be anticipated and planned for, Ege et al. (2018) examine
a setting where busyness cannot be anticipated.
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Corp Fin is comprised of 11 ADOs, each of which is wholly responsible for reviewing
firms in a given industry, defined by a 4-digit SIC code. In addition to requiring that registrants
be reviewed at least once every three years, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) establishes criteria
to assist the SEC in selecting filings for review. SOX Section 408 lists these criteria as
(i) issuers that have issued material restatements of financial results, (ii) issuers that experience
significant volatility in their stock price as compared to other issuers, (iii) issuers with the larg-
est market capitalization, (iv) emerging companies with disparities in price-to-earnings ratios,
and (v) issuers whose operations significantly affect any material sector of the economy
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002).6 Apart from these guidelines, ADOs have sole discretion over
which firms and filings to review. Reviews vary in scope and may be cover to cover (a
complete review of the financial statements and footnotes), financial statements only (with key
disclosures), or targeted issues (only disclosures related to a specific topic, such as revenue
recognition).
If a filing review reveals any GAAP noncompliance or deficiency in disclosure, the ADO
will issue a comment letter requesting additional information, recommending a disclosure revision
in the current filing, or requesting that a disclosure be amended in all future filings. A comment
letter may address multiple concerns, and firms have 10 days to respond to the SEC. Sometimes
there are multiple rounds of comments and responses before resolution. When the issues are ade-
quately remediated, the ADO will issue a letter stating that it has no further comments and that
the process is closed.
3. Hypothesis development
As discussed in section 1, financial professionals’ busyness is associated with adverse outcomes.
For example, busy boards of directors are associated with weaker corporate governance, and audi-
tor workload compression is negatively associated with measures of reporting quality. Our first
hypothesis tests the impact of SEC busyness on comment letter issuance. Given that firms’ fiscal
year-ends tend to cluster around December, ADOs are busiest when these firms file their
10-Ks. Workload compression could motivate ADOs to review fewer filings or reduce the extent
of their review, thereby reducing the likelihood that a 10-K comment letter is issued. This leads
to our first hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1. There is a negative association between ADO busyness and the SEC’s propen-
sity to issue a comment letter.
Our second set of hypotheses explores how effectively the SEC identifies serious instances of
noncompliance, conditional on ADO busyness. Reviews that are narrower in scope may reduce the
SEC’s ability to identify deficiencies, leading to a negative association between the seriousness of
comment letter outcomes and resource constraints. However, the SEC may devote limited resources
to remediating serious disclosure issues, consistent with its goal of “continually [directing] its
resources towards the most productive uses for investors and the public” (SEC 2012, 42). There-
fore, we expect ADOs to devote greater attention to serious issues during busy periods, leading to
more restatements arising from comment letters (which we refer to as comment letter-initiated
restatements) and more comment letters related to revenue recognition. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 2A. There is a positive association between ADO busyness and the likelihood
that a comment letter initiates a financial statement restatement.
6. See https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf
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HYPOTHESIS 2B. There is a positive association between ADO busyness and the likelihood
that a comment letter identifies a revenue recognition issue.
Our final hypothesis explores the impact of SEC busyness on the speed with which comment
letters reach market participants. Timeliness is an important metric of the filing review process
because comment letters contain information relevant to the assessment of firm value. Unlike
other financial professionals, ADOs do not have deadlines for filing reviews.7 Therefore, ADOs
could balance their increased workload by extending the filing review process into the future. To
the extent this is true, we would expect to see a positive association between busyness and com-
ment letter processing time. We state our final hypothesis as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 3. There is a positive association between ADO busyness and comment letter
processing time.
4. Sample selection and variable measurement
Sample selection
Figure 1 summarizes the sample selection process. To test our hypotheses that ADO busyness
influences the comment letter process, we begin with 58,490 firms in the COMPUSTAT Annual
database between 2005 and 2013. Next, we require each observation to have an audit opinion in
the Audit Analytics database. This requirement yields a sample of 54,006 firm-years. In May
2004, the SEC began publicly disclosing all comment letter correspondence on the EDGAR sys-
tem after resolution of the comment letter process. We begin our sample in 2005, even though
comment letter correspondence became publicly available in 2004, because the majority of com-
ment letters in 2004 relate to disclosures of auditor changes on Form 8-K. We end our sample in
2013 (i.e., fiscal year-ends through May 31, 2014) to allow for sufficient time for resolution of
comment letter items and disclosure of financial restatements. Next, we delete observations with-
out the necessary data to calculate our control variables (from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, or Audit
Analytics). These steps result in a sample of 26,620 firm-years, including 7,386 firm-years with
10-K comment letters.
Busyness measure
ADOs under Corp Fin have two main responsibilities: conducting filings reviews and issuing
comment letters. Although the SEC may review any of a registrant’s filings, we focus on 10-K fil-
ings for two reasons. First, according to Dechow et al. (2016), Form 10-Ks contain the most com-
prehensive disclosure about a firm’s critical accounting policies and application of GAAP during
the period. Thus, 10-K reviews conducted by ADOs are likely to be more time-consuming and
Figure 1 Sample selection
COMPUSTAT firm-years beween 2005 and 2013
(with nonmissing industry classification and filing report date) 58,490
Firms with an audit opinion in Audit Analytics 54,006
Firm-years with no missing control variables in COMPUSTAT, CRSP,
or Audit Analytics 26,620
Number of firm-years with comment letters 7,386
7. Augmenting this contention is a discussion with a former Corp Fin employee who suggested that ADOs do not hire
temporary employees to facilitate the filing review process during busy periods.
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require greater resources than reviews of other filings such as 8-Ks. Second, Bozanic et al. (2017)
suggest that over 70 percent of filing reviews conducted by the SEC focus exclusively on
10-Ks. Therefore, we focus on ADO busyness based on the number of 10-Ks filed.
To understand ADO busyness, we examine the frequency of firms’ fiscal year-end dates by
month and ADO office. Panel A of Table 1 reveals that an overwhelming majority of firms have
a December fiscal year-end (i.e., 19,023/26,620 = 71.46 percent). The next busiest fiscal year-end
is June, in which only 6.37 percent (1,697/26,620) of firms file their 10-K. The filing volume by
month indicates that ADOs would be resource constrained by December fiscal year-ends but less
so in other months of the year. This constraint is revealed in panel B of Table 1, which shows
that 10-K filing dates cluster in January, February, and March. Therefore, we proxy for ADO
busyness with a binary variable equal to one if a firm has a December fiscal year-end, and zero
otherwise (FYR12).
Comment letters
We retrieve information about 10-K comment letters from Audit Analytics’ Comment Letters
database. Our comment letter variable (Comment) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm
received a comment letter on its 10-K filing for fiscal year t, and zero otherwise.
Comment letter severity: SEC-initiated restatements and comment letters related to revenue
recognition
We follow Cassell et al. (2013) to identify SEC-initiated restatements. First, for our sample of
7,386 comment letter firms, we identify firm-years for which a 10-K restatement was disclosed
between the initial comment letter date and the comment letter correspondence date posted to SEC
EDGAR (i.e., the dissemination date). This results in a sample of 760 restatements. For each
restatement in this sample, we read the restatement disclosure and the comment letter correspon-
dence to determine whether the restatement was initiated by the comment letter process. This pro-
cess resulted in a final sample of 303 SEC-initiated restatements arising from comment letters. We
define an indicator variable equal to one if a financial statement restatement was initiated by a com-
ment letter, and zero otherwise (SECInitiated_Rest). We also identify restatements that were not ini-
tiated by the SEC review process to capture whether the filing review process failed to identify a
serious deficiency. We define an indicator variable equal to one for firms that issued a restatement
that was not initiated by a comment letter, and zero otherwise (nonSECInitiated_Rest).
Dechow et al. (2016) identify revenue recognition issues as a proxy for comment letter serious-
ness. The Audit Analytics Comment Letters Database assigns a code of 212—“Revenue recognition
(including deferred revenue) issues”—to comment letters pertaining to revenue recognition. There-
fore, we construct an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s comment letter identifies a revenue
recognition-related issue, and zero otherwise (Revenue_Comment).
Comment letter processing time
ADOs have discretion over various aspects of the filing review process, including control over
the timeliness of comment letters. To capture the timeless of comment letters, we define a variable
(DaysToProcess), calculated as the number of days between a firm’s 10-K filing date and the date
of the initial comment letter from the SEC.
5. Research design
Testing Hypothesis 1
Comment letters arise as a result of two underlying processes. The first of these is the SEC’s deci-
sion to review a 10-K, and the second is the probability that the SEC issues a comment letter,
conditional on review. Of these two processes, only the comment letter is directly observable.
Prior literature examining the receipt of comment letters in a given year t disregards this problem
12 Contemporary Accounting Research
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of partial observability and treats firms without comment letters as if they had not been reviewed. In
other words, such studies equate the probability of review with the probability of receiving a com-
ment letter. However, firms with no comment letter may not have been reviewed or were reviewed
but the SEC detected no errors. Ignoring this problem of partial observability results in inefficient esti-
mators compared to those obtained under fully observable outcomes (Feinstein 1990; Poirier 1980).
To address this concern, we use a binary probit model that explicitly models both the SEC’s
decision to review a 10-K and the probability that they issue a comment letter, holding constant
the probability of a filing review.8 The binary probit model has several advantages. According to
Poirier (1980) and Feinstein (1990), under conditions of partial observability, estimators produced
by the binary probit model are more efficient and contain reduced measurement error relative to
OLS estimators. Second, disaggregating the comment letter process into its component decisions
allows us to understand better the relative impact the SEC’s underlying actions (reviewing the fil-
ing and addressing deficiencies) have on the observable outcome of comment letter issuance.
Bivariate probit model with partial observability
In constructing our bivariate probit model, we follow Wang (2013).9 To illustrate our methodol-
ogy, let Ri be the probability that the SEC reviews firm i’s 10-K and Li be the probability the
SEC issues a comment letter, conditional on the probability of review (conditional on Ri). Both Ri
and Li are the result of SEC- and firm-specific factors related to the SEC’s assessment of firm’s
ex ante disclosure quality. Further, Ri and Li are strictly greater than zero if a 10-K is reviewed
and the SEC issues a comment letter. Comment letter issuance, Ci, is defined as the interaction
between Ri and Li (Ri×Li). Following Wang (2013), we define Ri and Li to have mean-zero error
terms with a correlation of ρ.
Two conditions are required for identification of the bivariate probit model parameters. First,
the vectors of explanatory variables for the probability of filing review and the probability of
comment letter issuance cannot be identical (i.e., each process has distinct determinants). Second,
explanatory variables in both bivariate models should exhibit as much variation as possible. Thus,
continuous covariates are preferable to discrete ones.10 We follow prior literature and economic
theory to select the determinants of the probability that the SEC reviews the 10-K and issues a
comment letter on that filing (conditional on review). We obtain the estimator of interest, Ci (the
probability of comment letter issuance, conditional on filing review), through maximum likeli-
hood of the interaction between Ri and Li.
Determinants of the probability of a 10-K filing review: “Prob(Review)”
We model the probability that a given filing is reviewed as a function of the following factors.
First, the likelihood that a firm’s 10-K is reviewed is strongly associated with firm size. Conversa-
tions with a former Corp Fin employee revealed that ADOs generally review large firms annually
and smaller firms once every three years. While there is no explicit guidance surrounding filing
review processes for larger and smaller firms, the employee suggested that the SEC uses acceler-
ated filer status as a metric when designing review frequency. Therefore, we use accelerated filer
status to capture predictable variation in review frequency attributable to firm size. Specifically,
we include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is a large accelerated filer (i.e., the public
float is $700 million or more), and zero otherwise (Large). We also include an indicator variable
8. We assume that if the SEC issues a comment letter, the issue identified is valid (i.e., we assume there are no Type I
errors in our sample). To the extent this assumption is spurious, measurement error would be embedded in our
empirical models. This possibility reduces measurement power rather than introducing systematic bias.
9. Wang (2013) uses the bivariate probit model to address a setting comparable to comment letters. Her study explic-
itly models the probability of securities fraud as a product of fraud being committed and fraud being detected, con-
ditional on having occurred.
10. The criteria for the identification of bivariate probit model parameters are from Poirier (1980).
Influences of Busyness on SEC Compliance Activities 15
CAR Vol. 37 No. 1 (Spring 2020)
equal to one if the firm is a small nonaccelerated filer (i.e., the public float is less than $75 mil-
lion), and zero otherwise (Small).
Consistent with the determinants of SEC review discussed in SOX, we include whether the
firm announced a 10-K restatement during the fiscal year (Rest_Announced). We also measure
the volatility of abnormal monthly stock returns (Volatility) and whether the firm is in the highest
quintile of price-to-earnings ratio (HighPE). Therefore, we model the probability that the SEC
reviews a 10-K filing as follows:
Reviewit = β0 + β1Rest_Announcedit + β2Volatilityit + β3HighPEit + β4Largeit + β5Smallit + εit: ð1aÞ
See the Appendix for variable definitions. In all regressions, we include a series of indicator
variables for fiscal year and industry (based on ADO assignment).
Determinants of the probability of issuing a comment letter conditional on review: “Prob
(Comment | Review)”
Our model for the probability that the SEC issues a comment letter, conditional on a review of
the 10-K filing, is as follows:
Commentit = β0 + β1FYR12it + β2logMVit + β3FirmAgeit + β4Lossit + β5AltZit
+ β6ExtFinit + β7SalesGrowthit + β8Segmentsit + β9M&Ait
+ β10Restructureit + β11Big4it + β122ndTierit + β13Levit + β14Betait + εit: ð1bÞ
Prior literature finds that firm size and age are positively associated with the receipt of a com-
ment letter (Cassell et al. 2013; Johnston and Petacchi 2017). Therefore, we expect a positive coeffi-
cient on logMV and FirmAge. Financially distressed firms face greater capital market pressures and
are more likely to manipulate the financial statements and related disclosures in response to these
pressures. We expect Loss and AltZ to be positively associated with comment letter issuance. High
growth firms likely face similar pressures as distressed firms, so we expect SalesGrowth to be posi-
tively associated with comment letter receipt. Firms raising external financing also have incentives to
manipulate accounting numbers and information; however, these firms also face higher levels of mon-
itoring by outside stakeholders. Thus, the effect of ExtFinance on comment letter activity is unclear.
Cassell et al. (2013) note that operational complexity may allow a firm to conceal manipulation
of accounting information. Therefore, we expect Segments, M&A, and Restructure to be positively
associated with the SEC’s propensity to issue a comment letter. If the presence of a high-quality
external auditor improves reporting quality, we expect Big4 and 2ndTier will be negatively associ-
ated with comment letter issuance.
Lastly, the prior literature suggests that firms’ choice of fiscal year-end differs by industry mem-
bership (Feng 2013; Huberman and Kandel 1989; Kamp 2002) and firm characteristics, including
size, market beta, and leverage (Smith and Pourciau 1988). As such, we include controls for industry
membership—a series of indicator variables for each industry based on the ADO office to which the
registrant is assigned.11 We also include the mean value of the year-end decile-ranked beta portfolio
to which the firm is assigned by CRSP (Beta) and total liabilities divided by total assets (Lev).12
11. In untabulated sensitivity analysis, we include industry indicator variables based on the 19 industries defined by
Huberman and Kandel (1989) and the 14 industries defined by Feng (2013). Our results are robust to these alterna-
tive measures of industry membership.
12. Cassell et al. (2013) find that whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO_Chair) is positively and sig-
nificantly related to comment letter receipt. We are unable to achieve convergence of the bivariate probit model
when we include CEO_Chair because the inclusion of too many binary explanatory variables reduces our ability to
fully specify the model. However, sensitivity analysis reveals that our results are robust to including CEO_Chair
when we combine Big4 and 2ndTier into a single control variable.
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Testing Hypothesis 2
To test Hypothesis 2A, we estimate the following logistic regression on the 7,386 firm-years that
received a 10-K comment letter.
SECInitiated_Restit =ψ0 +ψ1FYR12it +ψ2Rest_Announcedit +ψ3Volatilityit
+ψ4HighPEit +ψ5logMVit +ψ6FirmAgeit +ψ7Lossit
+ψ8AltZit +ψ9ExtFinit +ψ10SalesGrowthit +ψ11Segmentsit
+ψ12M&Ait +ψ13Restructureit +ψ14Big4it +ψ152ndTierit
+ψ16Levit +ψ17Betait + εit: ð2aÞ
To facilitate efficient capital allocation, the SEC might focus its limited resources on firms
with the most serious issues during busy periods. Serious disclosure issues identified during
the comment letter process are more likely to result in a financial statement restatement. To
test the SEC’s propensity to identify serious issues when busy, we define serious comment let-
ters as those for which the firm has a restatement that was initiated by the comment letter pro-
cess (SECInitiated_Rest). We then regress SECInitiated_Rest on the same covariates identified
in equation (1b) in addition to three additional variables identified by Cassell et al. (2013) to
explain comment letter seriousness: Rest_Announced, Volatility, and HighPE. The main coeffi-
cient of interest in equation (2a) is ψ1. We predict that ψ1 will be positive, which is consistent
with the SEC focusing its limited resources on the most serious instances of noncompliance
during busy periods.
To test Hypothesis 2B, we model the probability that a comment letter includes a revenue-
related issue as follows:
Revenue_Commentit = μ0 + μ1FYR12it + μ2Rest_Announcedit + μ3Volatilityit + μ4HighPEit
+ μ5logMVit + μ6FirmAgeit + μ7Lossit + μ8AltZit
+ μ9ExtFinit + μ10SalesGrowthit + μ11Segmentsit
+ μ12M&Ait + μ13Restructureit + μ14Big4it + μ152ndTierit
+ μ16Levit + μ17Betait + εit: ð2bÞ
The main coefficient of interest in equation (2b) is μ1. We predict that μ1 will be positive,
which is consistent with the SEC focusing its limited resources on compliance issues related to
revenue recognition. The association between filer characteristics and comment letter topics is
briefly discussed in Cassell et al. (2013) but largely remains an empirical question. Therefore, we
do not make predictions for the control variables in equation (2b).
Testing Hypothesis 3
In this section, we examine how busyness influences the timeliness with which comment letter
information is conveyed. Since comment letter processing time is available only for firms that
received comment letters, we estimate the following OLS regressions on the 7,386 firm-years that
received a 10-K comment letter:
DaysToProcessit = λ0 + λ1FYR12it + λ2Rest_Announcedit + λ3Volatilityit
+ λ4HighPEit + λ5logMVit + λ6FirmAgeit + λ7Lossit + λ8AltZit
+ λ9ExtFinit + λ10SalesGrowthit + λ11Segmentsit + λ12M&Ait
+ λ13Restructureit + λ14Big4it + λ152ndTierit + λ16Levit + λ17Betait
+ λ18NumRounds + λ19NumTopics + εit: ð3Þ
We regress DaysToProcess on the same covariates identified in equations (2a) and (2b). In
addition, we include two variables that capture comment letter characteristics that are likely
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related to processing time. First, we include the number of rounds (NumRounds), which is equal
to the number of letters sent from the SEC during the comment letter process. Second, we include
the total number of topics (NumTopics) identified by Audit Analytics in the comment letter.
Cassell et al. (2013) use the number of comment letter rounds to proxy for the costs of remedia-
tion and the number of topics to measure the extent of the SEC’s review procedures. Presumably,
a greater value of NumRounds represents higher remediation costs, as do comment letters that
address many topics. We thus predict that NumTopics and NumRounds will be positively associ-
ated with our measure of comment letter processing time. The main coefficient of interest in equa-
tion (3) is λ1. We predict that λ1 will be positive, which is consistent with the SEC taking longer
to issue comment letters when busy.
6. Descriptive statistics
Table 1, panel A, reports the distribution of firms’ fiscal year-end dates across each of the
11 ADOs. December has the most fiscal year-ends for all of the ADOs, followed by June. The
last two columns of Table 1 report the frequency of comment letters by ADO. 27.7 percent of
the firm-years in our sample period receive a 10-K comment letter (7,386/26,620). There is inter-
ADO variation in the number of comment letters issued during our sample period, consistent with
variation in the number of firms comprising various sectors of the economy. However, the varia-
tion is not so pronounced as to suggest that ADO-specific characteristics explain comment letter
issuance. Table 1, panel B, reports the distribution of firms’ 10-K filing dates across each of the
11 ADOs. Sixty-two percent of firm-years in our sample have a February or March 10-K filing
date. Therefore, it appears that the clustering of 10-K fiscal year-end dates also leads to a cluster-
ing of filing dates.
Panels A and B of Table 2 report descriptive statistics for the full sample of 26,620 firm-years
between 2005 and 2013 with nonmissing data. As previously stated, 27.7 percent (7,386) of firm-
years are the recipient of a comment letter on the 10-K (Comment). Consistent with the majority
of firms following a calendar-year fiscal year, 71.5 percent of observations have a December fiscal
year-end (FYR12). A small but nontrivial proportion (9.2 percent) of firms announces a financial
statement restatement during the sample period (Rest_Announced). Almost 40 percent of firm-
years have large accelerated filer status (Large), and approximately 11.2 percent are small non-
accelerated filers (Small). On average, firms in our sample are older, with mean FirmAge
of slightly under 18 years. Consistent with more established firms hiring reputable auditors, 73.9
percent of firm-years use a Big 4 auditor (Big4), and 11.6 percent use a national audit firm
(2ndTier).
In the last three rows of Table 2, panel A, we provide descriptive statistics for the 7,386 firm-
years that received a comment letter. We find that 4 percent (303/7,386) of comment letter firm-
years have a restatement that was initiated by the SEC comment letter process (SECInitiated_Rest).
This percentage is similar to Cassell et al. (2013), who find that over 3.1 percent of their sample
firm-years (211/6,702) have a restatement attributable to a comment letter. Among 7,386 firm-years
with a comment letter, 20.6 percent of comment letters addressed a revenue recognition-related
issue (Revenue_Comment). Finally, the average processing time (DaysToProcess, or the number of
days between the 10-K filing date and the date of the initial comment letter) is 152.
Table 2, panel B, reports Pearson correlations for the covariates in our bivariate probit and
logistic regressions. Contrary to our prediction that comment letter issuance declines with ADO
busyness, Comment is positively correlated with FYR12. However, we note that Comment is sig-
nificantly correlated with our proxies for firm size. The largest Pearson correlation coefficients in
column (1) are between Comment and Large (correlation = 0.159, significant at 1 percent level)
and Comment and logMV (correlation = 0.135, significant at 1 percent level). In addition, FYR12
is positively correlated with multiple measures of size (Large and logMV), which suggests that
firm size is a determinant of both fiscal year-ends and comment letter issuance. We suggest cau-
tion when interpreting univariate correlations reported in Table 2, panel B, as results may suffer
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from correlated omitted variables bias. Consistent with prior literature, comment letter issuance is
also correlated with financial distress (AltZ), operational complexity (Segments and M&A), and
leverage (Lev).
7. Results
Results of testing Hypothesis 1
Panel A of Table 3 reports univariate results for the test of Hypothesis 1 that comment letter issu-
ance decreases with ADO busyness. We divide the full sample of 26,620 firm-years into
TABLE 3
Univariate results for the test of Hypothesis 1
Panel A: Univariate analysis by whether the firm received a comment letter
Comment = 0 (observations = 19,234) Comment = 1 (observations = 7,386)
Mean Median Mean Median
FYR12 0.708 1.000 0.732*** 1.000***
Rest_Announced 0.085 0.000 0.111*** 0.000***
Volatility 0.127 0.109 0.123*** 0.104***
HighPE 0.095 0.000 0.112*** 0.000***
Large 0.333 0.000 0.504*** 1.000***
Small 0.124 0.000 0.078*** 0.000***
logMV 6.088 6.043 6.710*** 6.817***
FirmAge 17.203 14.000 19.330*** 16.000***
Loss 0.324 0.000 0.274*** 0.000***
AltZ 4.436 4.000 4.666*** 5.000***
ExtFin 0.017 −0.005 0.012** −0.009**
SalesGrowth 0.158 0.081 0.153 0.073*
Segments 2.280 1.000 2.550*** 2.000***
M&A 0.023 0.000 0.027** 0.000**
Restructure 0.013 0.000 0.016 0.000
Big4 0.722 1.000 0.783*** 1.000***
2ndTier 0.121 0.000 0.105*** 0.000***
Lev 0.931 0.124 1.588** 0.199***
Beta 0.967 0.764 1.014*** 0.764***
Panel B: Univariate analysis of December fiscal year-end by whether the firm received a comment letter and
size decile
Comment = 0 Comment = 1
Mean Median Mean Median
FYR12 (Q5, Largest quintile of logMV) 0.734 1.000 0.764** 1.000**
FYR12 (Q4) 0.755 1.000 0.764 1.000
FYR12 (Q3) 0.742 1.000 0.741 1.000
FYR12 (Q2) 0.696 1.000 0.707 1.000
FYR12 (Q1, Smallest quintile of logMV) 0.632 1.000 0.628 1.000
Notes: The sample consists of 26,620 firm-years between 2005 and 2013 (7,386 of which received a comment
letter from the SEC). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively
(two-tailed), of the difference between the comment letter and noncomment letter samples. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent percentiles. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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subsamples of comment letter firms (7,386 firm-years) and noncomment letter firms. We then
compare the mean and median values of FYR12 across the subsamples. Consistent with the corre-
lation results in Table 2, panel B, the mean and median values of FY12 are significantly higher
for comment letter firms relative to noncomment letter firms. These univariate results are contrary
to our intuition that comment letter issuance decreases during ADOs’ busy period. However, as
explained in the discussion of Table 2, panel B, these results are likely attributable to correlated
omitted variables. Panel B of Table 3 repeats the univariate analysis on firm-years with a
December fiscal year-end, stratified by comment letter receipt and size quintile. The results reveal
that the positive correlation between FYR12 and Comment is driven by the largest quintile of size.
This result implies that, consistent with the guidance in SOX, the SEC prioritizes large firms
when designing its review procedures. Overall, our univariate results highlight the importance of
carefully considering firm characteristics when modeling the probability that the SEC reviews a
filing or issues a comment letter.
We test Hypothesis 1 by estimating models (1a) and (1b); the results of these estimations are
reported in Table 4. The first stage regression models the probability that the SEC selects a firm’s
10-K for review. The coefficients on Rest_Announced and Volatility are positive and significant
(coefficients = 0.121 and 0.144, p-values = 0.000 and 0.094, respectively), which suggests that
financial statement restatements and stock price volatility increase the probability of review. Con-
sistent with larger firms being reviewed more frequently, Large is significant and positive
(coefficient = 0.180, p-value = 0.000).
The second bivariate regression in Table 4 reports the results of estimating the probability
that the SEC issues a 10-K comment letter, conditional on having selected that 10-K for review.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that ADO busyness around the firm’s 10-K filing
date is associated with a lower propensity to issue a comment letter (FYR12 coefficient = −0.128,
p-value = 0.010). When all variables are set to their mean values, the likelihood that the SEC
issues a comment letter is 1.56 percent lower during busy relative to less busy periods, holding
constant the probability of filing review.13
Other significant determinants of the propensity to issue a comment letter are size (logMV
coefficient = 0.374, p-value = 0.000), FirmAge (coefficient = 0.007, p-value = 0.017), financial
distress (AltZ coefficient = 0.047, p-value = 0.000), operational complexity (Segments, M&A, and
Restructure, coefficients = 0.041, 0.218, and 0.554, p-values = 0.032, 0.095, and 0.091, respec-
tively), and having a high-quality auditor (Big4 coefficient = −0.435, p-value = 0.000, 2ndTier
coefficient = −0.163, p-value = 0.073). Taken together, the results in Table 4 are consistent with
the prediction that ADO busyness decreases the SEC’s propensity to issue a comment letter, hold-
ing constant the probability of filing review.
Results of testing Hypothesis 2
We test Hypothesis 2A by estimating a logistic regression of the probability that the firm-year
subsequently announces a financial statement restatement arising from a comment letter issued on
the 10-K (SECInitiated_Rest) on busyness. We report the results of estimating equation (2a) in
Table 5. We find that FYR12 is significantly and positively associated with SECInitiated_Rest
(coefficient = 0.230, p-value = 0.023). These results are consistent with the SEC allocating its
limited resources to identifying the most serious instances of noncompliance (those that require a
restatement) during busy periods. In terms of economic significance, when all variables are set to
their mean values, the estimated probability of an SEC-initiated restatement is 1.92 percent more
likely when busy.
Regarding the control variables, the issuance of a restatement during year t (likely on a prior
year financial statement) is a significant determinant of a restatement initiated by the comment
13. We calculate economic significance by computing the difference between the probability that the SEC issues a com-
ment letter [1/(1 + exp[− β0 − β1 × FYR12it − CONTROLS])], when FYR12 = 1 and FYR12 = 0.
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letter process (Rest_Announced coefficient = 0.733, p-value < 0.000). Contrary to intuition, firms
with a large disparity in price-to-earnings ratios have a lower probability of an SEC-initiated
restatement (HighPE coefficient = −0.406, p-value = 0.037). If the SEC closely monitors such
firms in accordance with SOX guidance, then the filing review process may be a deterrent to mis-
reporting so severe as to require a restatement. The deterrence effect of filing reviews may explain
the negative coefficient on HighPE reported in Table 5. Size (logMV) and FirmAge are both nega-
tively and significantly associated with SECInitiated_Rest, consistent with larger and older firms
being less likely to experience a restatement arising from the comment letter process.
Finally, Segments is positively associated with SECInitiated_Rest (coefficient = 0.056,
p-value = 0.065), consistent with operational complexity increasing the likelihood of a restate-
ment. Both our proxies of auditor quality are negatively associated with the dependent vari-
able, suggesting that high-quality auditors deter material misreporting (Big4 and 2ndTier
coefficients = −0.436 and −0.610, p-values = 0.023 and 0.011, respectively).
We test our second hypothesis on comment letter seriousness by estimating equation (2b);
results of this logistic regression are reported in Table 6. The positive association between ADO
TABLE 4
Bivariate probit model with partial observability on whether the firm receives a comment letter on SEC
busyness
Prob(Review) Prob(Comment Letter | Review)
Pred. Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Constant ? −1.151*** (0.000) 0.592 (0.194)
Rest_Announced + 0.121*** (0.000)
Volatility + 0.144* (0.094)
HighPE + −0.005 (0.834)
Large + 0.180*** (0.000)
Small − 0.028 (0.491)
FYR12 − −0.128*** (0.010)
logMV + 0.374*** (0.000)
FirmAge + 0.007** (0.017)
Loss + −0.025 (0.694)
AltZ + 0.047*** (0.000)
ExtFin ? −0.008 (0.301)
SalesGrowth + 0.003 (0.443)
Segments + 0.041** (0.032)
M&A + 0.218* (0.095)
Restructure + 0.554* (0.091)
Big4 − −0.435*** (0.000)
2ndTier − −0.163* (0.073)
Leverage + −0.001 (0.184)
Beta + 0.066 (0.114)
Industry fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
No. of firm-years (comment letters) 26,620 (7,386)
Wald chi-square (df ) 929 (55)
Log likelihood −14,845
Notes: The sample consists of 26,620 firm-years between 2005 and 2013 (7,386 of which received a
comment letter from the SEC). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively (two-tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent percentiles. See the
Appendix for variable definitions.
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busyness (FYR12 coefficient = 0.116, p-value = 0.044) and whether the comment letter includes a
revenue-related issue (Revenue_Comment) suggests that firms filing their 10-K during the SEC’s
busy time are more likely to receive a comment letter related to revenue noncompliance. In terms
of economic significance, when all variables are set to their mean values, the estimated probabil-
ity of a comment letter related to revenue is 3.74 percent more likely when busy. Firm character-
istics like stock price volatility (Volatility coefficient = 0.636, p-value = 0.087) and firms with
negative earnings (Loss coefficient = 0.414, p-value < 0.001) are also more likely to receive a com-
ment letter relating to revenue recognition.
Regression results reported in Tables 5 and 6 pertain only to firm-years that received a comment
letter. Isolating comment letter firm-years allows us to draw inferences regarding the extent to which
the SEC successfully identifies serious disclosure deficiencies, conditional on having reviewed the
firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with Hypotheses 2A and 2B, and suggest that ADOs
focus on identifying the most serious instances of noncompliance during busy periods.
Additional test of Hypotheses 2A and 2B
The results reported in the previous section naturally motivate the question as to whether ADOs
are more likely to miss serious compliance issues during busy periods. To address this question,
TABLE 5
Logistic regression of whether the firm-year has an SEC-initiated restatement on SEC busyness, conditional




Constant ? −2.155*** ( < 0.0001)
FYR12 + 0.230** (0.023)
Rest_Announced + 0.733*** ( < 0.0001)
Volatility + 0.364 (0.634)
HighPE + −0.406** (0.037)
logMV − −0.163*** (0.001)
FirmAge ? −0.011* (0.074)
Loss + −0.059 (0.730)
AltZ + 0.031 (0.241)
ExtFin − 0.001 (0.835)
SalesGrowth + −0.009 (0.167)
Segments + 0.056* (0.065)
M&A + −0.340 (0.466)
Restructure + −0.173 (0.730)
Big4 − −0.436** (0.023)
2ndTier − −0.610** (0.011)
Lev + −0.001 (0.583)
Beta + −0.006 (0.950)
Year and industry fixed effects Yes
No. of firm-years 7,386
SEC-initiated restatements 303
Pseudo R2 0.0530
Notes: The sample consists of 7,386 firm-years with data between 2005 and 2013 that received a comment
letter from the SEC. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** represent statistical
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1 and 99 percent levels. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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we identify firms that have a high ex ante probability of being reviewed and then examine subse-
quent financial statement restatements not issued by the SEC to determine whether the filing
review process failed to identify a serious deficiency. In order to hold constant the likelihood of
having a filing review, we executed model (1a) on the full sample of 26,620 firm-years and iden-
tified 16,249 firm-years with a greater than 70 percent probability of experiencing a filing review,
regardless of comment letter issuance.14 For the firm-years with a high review probability, we
next identify those firms that announced a restatement not attributable to the comment letter pro-
cess (nonSECInitiated_Rest). If the SEC misses more issues during busy periods, then our proxy
of resource constraints, FYR12, should be positively and significantly associated with measures of
restatements not resulting from a comment letter. We report the results of this sensitivity test in
Table 7. We find that FYR12 is not significantly associated with nonSECInitiated_Rest, consistent
with the interpretation that busyness does not cause the SEC to overlook serious deficiencies in
disclosure quality.
TABLE 6
Logistic regression of whether the firm-year has a comment letter that mentions revenue recognition on SEC










Loss 0.414*** ( < 0.0001)










Year and industry fixed effects Yes
No. of firm-years 7,386
Revenue issues 1,518
Pseudo R2 0.0160
Notes: The sample consists of 7,386 firm-years with data between 2005 and 2013 that received a comment
letter containing an issue related to revenue recognition from the SEC. The standard errors are clustered by
firm and year. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively
(two-tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. See the Appendix for
variable definitions.
14. Results of the sensitivity analysis discussed in the section “Additional test of Hypotheses 2A and 2B” are robust to
various probabilities of review (e.g., 80 and 90 percent) as well as including all observations (n = 26,620).
26 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 37 No. 1 (Spring 2020)
Results of testing Hypothesis 3
Next, we assess the impact of ADO busyness on the timeliness of the comment letter process.
We estimate an OLS regression of equation (3) on 7,386 firm-years with a comment letter and
report the results in Table 8. FYR12 is significantly and positively associated with DaysToProcess
(coefficient = 6.194, p-value = 0.007), consistent with Hypothesis 3. This result implies that ADO
busyness reduces the timeliness with which enhanced financial disclosures reach market partici-
pants. Other factors that increase processing time include Volatility, ExtFin, Lev, and Beta. There
are two potential mechanisms linking ADO busyness and firm characteristics to processing time.
During busy periods, the SEC may initiate the filing review process (begin reviewing the filing
but take longer to send the initial comment letter), or they may postpone reviewing the filing and
issuing a comment letter. We are unable to observe the date on which the SEC begins filings
reviews, so we cannot fully disentangle these two explanations of increased processing time.
Additionally, our proxy for the scope of filing review procedures (NumTopics) is positively asso-
ciated with processing time (coefficient = 0.233, p-value = 0.042), suggesting that review com-
plexity increases processing time.
TABLE 7
Logistic regression of whether the firm-year has a non-SEC-initiated restatement on SEC busyness for a




Constant −2.684*** ( < 0.0001)
FYR12 −0.100 (0.333)
















Year and industry fixed effects Yes
No. of firm-years 16,249
Non-SEC-initiated restatements 1,537
Pseudo R2 0.0512
Notes: The sample consists of 16,249 firm-years with data between 2005 and 2013 that have a greater than
70 percent chance of being reviewed by the SEC (using equation (1a)). The standard errors are clustered by
firm and year. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively
(two-tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. See the Appendix for
variable definitions.
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Interestingly, the coefficients on both Big4 and 2ndTier are positive and significant in
Table 8. These coefficients suggest that the SEC places a lower priority on firms with high-quality
auditors, which implies that the presence of other monitors may serve as a substitute for regula-
tory oversight in our setting. Larger firms experience shorter processing time (logMV
coefficient = −12.336, p-value < 0.000), which is consistent with the SEC prioritizing timely
reviews of firms with a material impact on the economy. The coefficients on FirmAge, Loss, AltZ,
and NumRounds are also negative and significant. Negative coefficients may arise for two rea-
sons: (i) The length of the comment letter process is reduced or (ii) on average, comment letter
processing time remains unchanged, but the SEC prioritizes certain firms, compressing the review
process. Given the capital market pressures faced by financially distressed firms to manipulate
reported numbers and disclosures, we find it plausible that the SEC prioritizes reviewing dis-
tressed firms. We find it less likely that ADOs reduce the length of the overall review process for
such firms.
Additional test of Hypothesis 3
In this section, we explore the extent to which firm characteristics mitigate the association
between comment letter timeliness and ADO busyness. Therefore, we regress DaysToProcess on
TABLE 8
OLS regression of SEC comment letter processing time (number of days between a firm’s 10-K filing date
and the date of the initial comment letter from the SEC) on busyness
DaysToProcess
Coefficient p-value





logMV −12.336*** ( < 0.0001)








Big4 25.089*** ( < 0.0001)
2ndTier 18.774*** ( < 0.0001)
Lev 0.037*** (0.000)
Beta 7.971*** ( < 0.0001)
NumRounds −2.903*** ( < 0.0001)
NumTopics 0.233** (0.042)
Year and industry fixed effects Yes
No. of firm-years 7,386
R2 0.0919
Notes: The sample consists of 7,386 firm-years with data between 2005 and 2013 that received a comment
letter from the SEC. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** represent statistical
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1 and 99 percent levels. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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the same covariates identified in equations (2a) and (2b) and also interact busyness with each con-
trol variable. The interactions can shed light on which firm factors influence the relation between
ADO busyness and the timeliness of the comment letter process. For example, if the SEC priori-
tizes larger firms when busy, we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction between
busyness and size (FYR12it×logMVit).
Untabulated results reveal that the coefficient on the interaction between FYR12 and size is
negative and significant (FYR12×logMV coefficient = −4.795, p-value = 0.003). It is unlikely that
the SEC spends less time reviewing larger firms because size is a measure of operational com-
plexity; given that large firms are more complex and have a material economic impact, it is more
plausible that such firms are prioritized relative to small firms in the filing review process. Firms
with high sales growth also experience incrementally shorter comment letter processing time
when busy (FYR12×SalesGrowth coefficient = −4.951, p-value = 0.033). Finally, financially dis-
tressed firms experience longer processing times relative to their more financially stable peers
(FYR12×AltZ coefficient = 2.040, p-value = 0.036).
Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that SEC busyness delays the timeliness with which
ADOs complete filing reviews and issue initial comments. Comment letters provide incremental
information that influences the assessment of firm value. Thus, delays in the comment letter pro-
cess may reduce the overall transparency and quality of the firm’s information environment. Reg-
ulators concerned with enhancing the quality of information available to market participants may
consider the extent of resources allocated to the SEC to allow ADOs to execute their compliance
activities in a timelier manner.
8. Conclusion
Compliance plays an important role in the financial reporting oversight of the SEC. ADOs,
organized by industry, review registrants’ filings to ensure compliance with securities laws. If
an ADO identifies a departure from GAAP or disclosure regulations, they will issue a com-
ment letter seeking clarification or requesting additional information. However, the workload
for filing reviews is seasonally compressed because over 70 percent of registrants have a
December fiscal year-end. In this paper, we examine how seasonal busyness impacts the
SEC’s compliance function, with a specific focus on comment letter issuance, seriousness,
and timeliness.
Using a bivariate probit model to address the partial observability of the SEC’s compliance
activities, we find that ADOs are less likely to issue a 10-K comment letter when busy, holding
constant the probability of filing review. We also find that comment letters are more likely to
result in a financial statement restatement and identify issues pertaining to revenue recognition,
conditional on ADO busyness. Consistent with the SEC allocating its limited resources to identi-
fying serious instances of noncompliance, we find no evidence to suggest that ADOs systemati-
cally overlook material issues during busy periods. Finally, we report that the timeliness of the
comment letter process is reduced during busy periods; however, ADOs seem to prioritize
large firms.
Our findings suggest that allocating additional resources to ADOs would likely (i) broaden
the scope of comment letters when busy and (ii) shorten comment letter processing time when
busy. To help assess the costs/benefits of additional resources to ADOs, future research could
study the usefulness of broader scope comment letters and optimal comment letter processing
time. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and complement research examining com-
ment letter quality of transactional filings (e.g., IPOs and acquisitions), which require immediate
review (Ege et al. 2018).
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AltZ The descending decile rank of the firm’s financial health. Altman’s (1968) z-score
is equal to 3.3 × (earnings before interest and tax (PI + XINT)/total assets
(AT)) + 1.0 × (sales (REVT)/total assets) + 1.4 × (retained earnings (RE)/total
assets) + 1.2 × (net working capital (ACT − LCT)/total assets) + 0.6 × (market
value of equity (CSHO×PRCC_F)/book value of liabilities (LT)). Thus, firms
having the poorest financial health are assigned a value of 10, and firms with the
best financial health are assigned a value of zero (COMPUSTAT)
Beta Mean value of the systematic risk calculated using daily stock returns over the
fiscal year of the year-end decile-ranked beta portfolio to which the firm is
assigned (CRSP: BETAAV)
Big4 An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm
(Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PricewaterhouseCoopers), and zero
otherwise (COMPUSTAT: AU)
Comment An indicator variable equal to one if the firm received a comment letter on its
10-K filing for fiscal year t, and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics)
DaysToProcess The number of days between a firm’s 10-K filing date and the date of the initial
comment letter from the SEC (Audit Analytics)
ExtFin The sum of equity financing and debt financing scaled by total assets in t + 1.
Equity financing equals the sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus
the purchases of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) minus dividends
(DV). Debt financing equals long-term debt issued (DLTIS) minus long-term
debt reduction (DLTR) minus the change in current debt (DLCCH)
(COMPUSTAT)
FirmAge The total number of years for which assets (AT) are reported on COMPUSTAT
FYR12 An indicator variable equal to one for firms with a fiscal year-end in December,
and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT)
HighPE An indicator variable equal to one if the price (PRCC_F) earnings (IBC) ratio is in
the highest quintile, and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT)
Large An indicator variable equal to one if the public float is $700 million or more, and
zero otherwise (Audit Analytics)
Lev Total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets (AT) (COMPUSTAT)
logMV The natural logarithm of the market value of equity in millions (COMPUSTAT:
CSHO×PRCC_F)
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items (IB) is
negative, and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT)
M&A An indicator variable equal to one if pre-tax acquisitions or mergers (AQP) are
nonzero, and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT)
nonSECInitiated_Rest An indicator variable equal to one if a restatement of year t financial statements
was not initiated by a comment letter, and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics,
hand-collected)
NumRounds The number of letters sent from the SEC during the comment letter process (Audit
Analytics)
NumTopics The number of issue codes (i.e., topics) identified in the first comment letter
(Audit Analytics)
Revenue_Comment An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s comment letter identifies a revenue
recognition-related issue [Audit Analytics topic 212, “Revenue recognition
(including deferred revenue) issues”], and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics)
Rest_Announced An indicator variable equal to one for firms that announced a 10-K restatement in
year t, and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics)
(The Appendix is continued on the next page.)
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Variable Definition
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SECInitiated_ Rest An indicator variable equal to one if a restatement of year t financial statements
was initiated by a comment letter, and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics,
hand-collected)
2ndTier An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a national audit firm
(BDO Seidman, Crowe Horwath, Grant Thornton, or McGladrey & Pullen), and
zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT: AU)
Segments The number of business segments (COMPUSTAT Segment File)
Small An indicator variable equal to one if the public float is less than $75 million, and
zero otherwise (Audit Analytics)
Volatility The volatility of abnormal monthly stock returns (monthly return minus the value
weighted return). Return volatility is calculated over the 36-month period ending
in the last month of the fiscal year (CRSP)
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